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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Miranda Interrogations-Interroga-
tion Defined as Express Questioning or Its Functional
Equivalent. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
In Rhode Island v. Innis, I a divided2 United States Supreme
Court concluded that the procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda
v. Arizona3 must be adhered to "whenever a person in custody is
subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent."4
Finding that respondent Innis had not been subjected to express
questioning or its functional equivalent,5 the Court held that a viola-
tion of his Miranda rights6 had not occurred.7 In reaching its deci-
sion, the Court addressed for the first time8 the precise meaning of
"interrogation" for purposes of Miranda. I
On January 17, 1975, respondent was arrested at approximately
4:30 a.m. for the armed robbery of a cab driver which had occurred
earlier that evening, and for the robbery and murder of a cab driver
1. 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
2. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court, and was joined by Justices Black-
mun, Powell, and Rehnquist. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White filed brief concurring
opinions. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan joined. Justice
Stevens filed a lengthy dissenting opinion.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda indicated that unless other fully effective means could
be devised to inform an accused of his right to remain silent and to assure a continuous oppor-
tunity to exercise it, the following procedural safeguards must be employed prior to any ques-
tioning:
(T]he person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement
he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive ef-
fectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process
that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no question-
ing. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not
wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.
Id at 444-45.
4. 100 S. Ct. at 1689.
5. Id at 1690. The Court recognized that Innis had, in fact, been subjected to subtle
compulsion, but it refused to equate such treatment with the term "interrogation." Id at 1691.
6. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The main thrust of the Miranda decision was an attempt to
safeguard the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The Court held
that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming
from custodial interrogation of the defendant, unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Id at 444.
7. 100 S. Ct. at 1691.
8. Id at 1687. Although the Court had previously undertaken to determine whether
interrogation existed for purposes of Miranda, the decision in Innir represents its initial at-
tempt to specifically define the term. See note 62 infra.
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
which had occurred a few days before.'I Captain Leyden, who was
in charge of the investigation, subsequently advised respondent of
his Miranda rights." Respondent indicated that he understood
those rights and that he wanted to see an attorney.12 Shortly thereaf-
ter, the captain assigned three officers to transport and accompany
respondent to police headquarters. Captain Leyden specifically in-
structed the officers not to question, intimidate, or coerce respondent
in any way.'
3
While enroute to the station, the officers did not directly ques-
tion respondent. Two officers, however, did engage in a conversa-
tion among themselves concerning the inability of the police to find
the gun used in the recent murder. 4 One officer expressed concern
that a young girl from a nearby school for handicapped children
might find the weapon and injure herself, the other officer echoing
his concern. ' 5 Upon hearing this, respondent interrupted the conver-
sation and requested the officers to turn the car around so that he
could show them where the gun was hidden.' 6 The police once again
warned Innis of his constitutional rights, 1" after which respondent
led them to the location of the murder weapon.' 8
The trial court sustained the admissibility of the weapon and
the testimony related to its discovery over the objections of respon-
dent.' 9 The court did not address whether Innis had, in fact, been
interrogated by the officers, and concluded that his decision to in-
form the police of the location of the gun acted as a waiver of his
right to remain silent.20 On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme
10. Record at 302-4. The police were looking for Innis because he had been identified
from a wanted poster by the cab driver robbed earlier that evening. Id
11. Id at 337. Respondent had previously received the required warnings from two ad-
ditional patrolmen, and apparently had not conversed with either of them. Id at 305, 311.
12. According to the procedural safeguards provided by Miranda, all questioning must
cease when a suspect indicates that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking. See
note 3 supra.
13. Captain Leyden did not mention this instruction in his testimony, and only one of the
officers in the car testified that such an instruction had been given. Id at 337.
14. It is undisputed that everyone in the vehicle, including respondent, heard the officers'
conversation. 100 S. Ct. at 1686 n.l.
15. Although the exact words spoken by the officers are unclear, according to Officer
Williams' best recollection, the conversation proceeded verbatim as follows:
Gleckman: It would be too bad if a little girl would pick up the gun, and maybe
kill herself.
McKenna: Gee, it would be too bad.
Record at 374.
16. Id at 351.
17. Id at 337.
18. Id at 338.
19. Innis asserted that the introduction into evidence of the murder weapon, as well as
the testimony of the police officers relating to its discovery, violated his fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. - R.I. - _ 391 A.2d 1158, 1160 (1978).
20. The trial judge found that respondent had been repeatedly and completely advised of
his Miranda rights, and that he had intelligently waived his right to remain silent. 100 S. Ct. at
1687.
Court set aside respondent's conviction, 2' indicating that both the
gun and respondent's statements should have been suppressed.22
The court held that the officers' remarks in the car constituted inter-
rogation,23 and that Innis had not waived his Miranda rights by
speaking to the police.24 The United States Supreme Court subse-
quently granted certiorari25 in order to address for the first time the
meaning of "interrogation" for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 
26
and to determine whether Innis was, in fact, subjected to such "inter-
rogation."
Miranda held that since custodial interrogation 27 is inherently
coercive, 28 certain procedural safeguards must be employed29 prior
to the initiation of any such action by the police.30 Recognition of
this inherent coerciveness, however, has existed for many years.3
The Court has long been of the opinion that confessions or state-
ments obtained through physical brutality 2 or resulting from psy-
chological coercion 33 are the products of improper exercises of
authority and, therefore, are not admissible as evidence at trial.
Prior to 1964, a "voluntariness"3 4 or "totality of the circum-
21. The jury had convicted respondent of first degree felony murder, kidnapping, and
robbery. All the charges related to the incident involving the murdered cab driver.
22. - R.I. -, 391 A.2d 1158 (1978).
23. Even though the officers' remarks were neither directed at respondent nor made with
the intention of eliciting incriminating evidence from him, the court concluded that Innis had
been subjected to "subtle coercion" that, for purposes of Miranda, was the equivalent of inter-
rogation. - R.I. at _ 391 A.2d at 1162.
24. The court recognized that respondent had previously asserted his right to counsel,
and concluded that such conduct would be inconsistent with a finding that he subsequently
waived his Miranda rights. Id at _ 391 A.2d at 1163. See also State v. Lachapelle, 112 R.I.
105, 111, 308 A.2d 467, 470 (1973).
25. Rhode Island v. Innis, 440 U.S. 934 (1979).
26. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
27. The Miranda Court speaks in terms of "custodial interrogation", indicating that two
requirements must be met before an individual is afforded the protection offered by Muanda:
first, the individual must be in custody, or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action; and,
second, the individual must be interrogated Id at 444.
28. The Court indicated tht custodial interrogation "carries its own badge of intimida-
tion," id at 467, and "contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely." Id at 467.
29. See note 3 supra
30. 384 U.S. at 445-58.
31. The use of unethical, improper, and inherently coercive interrogation techniques by
police to obtain information from individuals suspected of crime has been a highly controver-
sial topic, at least since the Wickersham Commission report on police abuses was submitted in
1931. IV NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931). See Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger
Court, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99, 101.
32. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 446-47 n.7 (1966); White v- Texas, 310
U.S. 530 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
33. See, e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940).
34. See Stone, supra note 31, at 102-03.
stances" 35 test was employed by the Court in order to protect an ac-
cused from improper police interrogation. Statements that appeared
to have been involuntarily obtained, in light of the totality of the
surrounding circumstances, 36 were held inadmissible at trial. Be-
cause of the vagueness of the term "voluntary" and the Court's resul-
tant inability to precisely define its parameters, 37  the sixth
amendment guarantee of the right to counsel 38 soon replaced the
"voluntariness" test as the device utilized to control unscrupulous
police interrogation.39 The sixth amendment was found to exclude
any incriminating statements elicited from the accused after indict-
ment and in the absence of counsel.' The emphasis of the Court,
however, shifted 4' from the sixth amendment to the fifth amendment
when certiorari was granted in Miranda v. Arizona in order "to ex-
plore some facets of. . .applying the privilege againt self-incrimin-
tion to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow."42
The rigidity of the rules adopted in Miranda and the clear, con-
crete guidelines that they give law enforcement agencies 43 continue
to be the foremost attributes of the decision. ' Nevertheless, the ap-
plicability of the Miranda rules depends upon two factors---custody
35. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Spano v. N.Y., 360 U.S.
315, 321 n.2 (1959) (citing 28 cases); Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 873 (5th Cir. 1980).
36. In applying the "totality of the circumstances" or "voluntariness" test, the major fac-
tors taken into consideration by the Court included (but were not limited to) the characteristics
of the accused, see, e.g., Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.
49 (1962); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960), and the details of the interrogation, see,
e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Ashcrafl v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
37. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK & J. WIOMORE, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 149-50 (2d ed.
1972); Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 961-84 (1966); Kamisar,
What Is an "Involuntary" Confession 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728 (1963).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
39. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387 (1977) (on facts very similar to Inni, the Court based its opinion on the sixth amendment
right to counsel).
40. Id at 204-05. Massiah indicated that the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to
counsel required the exclusion of incriminating information deliberately elicited from an indi-
vidual in the absence of counsel after he had been indicted Id Since the majority of police
interrogations occurprior to indictment, Massiah, itself did not provide a great deal of protec-
tion for interrogation victims. See Stone, supra note 31, at 103.
Subsequent Court decisions had a tendency to increase the scope of Mfassiah. See, e.g.,
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (extending Massiah's sixth amendment protection to
include pre-indictment interrogation). Nevertheless, these extensions eventually led to such
confusion and uncertainty that the Court became dissatisfied with the sixth amendment's pro-
tection against unscrupulous police interrogation. See Stone, supra note 31, at 103.
41. See note 40 supra
42. 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966).
43. See note 3 supra
44. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S..at 479. See also Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S.
1310, 1314 (1978) (holding that the rigidity of Miranda affords police and courts clear guidance
on the manner in which to conduct a custodial interrogation). The current attitude of the
Court reflects a reluctance to extend Miranda or to extend its strictures on law enforcement
agencies, as recent decisions have evidenced an effort to limit Miranda's provisions to the
express terms and logic of the original opinion. Id at 1314-15. But see Stone, supra note 31, at
100 (indicating that Miranda has fallen into disfavor with the majority of the Court).
and interrogation.4 5 "Because the custody issue has arisen more fre-
quently and has generally been regarded as a more difficult one, a
good deal more attention has been paid to what constitutes custodial
interrogation than to what constitutes custodial interrogation. "46
The Supreme Court recognized that Innis represented its first at-
tempt to precisely define the term "interrogation" as it is used in
Miranda. 
47
Eighty-three years ago in Brain v. United States,48 the Court
recognized that an individual can be interrogated without direct
questioning by the police. Although the Miranda Court makes re-
peated reference to "questioning," 49 it is evident that the Court in-
tended custodial interrogation to encompass varieties of "question-
less" interrogation as well.5" Innis likewise indicates that Miranda
was not designed to merely protect individuals from direct question-
ing.5' Miranda was concerned with the evils inherent in the "inter-
rogation environment,"5 2 and with minimizing the pressure, tension,
and anxiety experienced by one subjected thereto.53 Thus, pressure
45. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
46. Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What Is "Interrogation' When
Does It Matter, 67 GEO. L.J. 1, 14 n.85 (1978).
47. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
48. 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (the only party who asked a question was Brain himself).
49. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). E.g., the Court indicates that "[bly custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers." Id at 444 (emphasis added).
Subsequent cases have also supported the view that questioning is an integral part of
interrogation under Miranda See,. e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (questioning
taking place in suspect's home after he had been arrested); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1
(1968) (questioning taking place in a prison during suspect's term of imprisonment).
50. The Miranda Court discussed at length the various tactics and techniques employed
by law enforcement agents in attempting to intrrogate suspects. 384 U.S. at 448-55. Reference
was made to interrogation techniques such as minimizing the moral seriousness of the offense
and casting blame on the victim or on society. Id at 450. The Court likewise recognized
strategies that do not require verbal statements by the interrogators, such as the "false line-up"
and the "reverse line-up." Id at 453. For a comprehensive discussion of the various interro-
gation techniques employed by police officers, see F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL ITrRROoA-
TION AND CONFESSIONS (2d ed. 1967).
For cases indicating that interrogation is not limited to express questioning, see, e.g.,
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1980);
Henry v. United States, 590 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Anderson, 523 F.2d 1192
(5th Cir. 1975); Eben v. State, 599 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1979); People v. Sanders, 55 Inl. App. 3d
178, 370 N.E.2d 1213 (1977); Ochoa v. State, 573 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1978); State
v. Boggs, 16 Wash. App. 682, 559 P.2d 11 (1977).
5 1. 100 S. Ct. at 1688. Although Miranda provides protection from express questioning
by police, its safeguards do not apply to words or actions normally attendant to arrest and
custody. Id. at 1689. Accord, 'Vines v. State, 285 Md. 369, 374, 402 A.2d 900, 904 (1979) (Mi-
randa does not apply to administrative questioning such as the routine questions asked of all
arrestees who are booked or otherwise processed); Kamisar, supra note 46, at 7 n.41.
52. 100 S. Ct. at 1688. The "interrogation environment" referred to in Innis is created by
the interplay of interrogation and custody. Neither custody nor interrogation alone results in
the type of coercive atmosphere that Miranda was designed to guard against. Thus, "'Interro-
gation,' as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above
and beyond that inherent in custody itself." Id at 1689. See also Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis:
A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 46 (1979).
53. The Miranda rules were intended to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, negat-
or compulsion must exist in order for a suspect to validly claim a
violation of his fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-in-
crimination, regardless of the form of interrogation.54
The Innis Court found such compulsion to exist whenever a
person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its
functional equivalent.5 5 Since respondent had not been subjected to
express questioning,56 the issue presented" was whether he had been
subjected to the Court's so-called functional equivalent of question-
ing.
The Court concluded that Innis had not been subjected to the
functional equivalent of questioning and, thus, had not been interro-
gated for purposes of Miranda. 58 "Functional equivalent" was con-
strued to be words or actions "that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the sus-
pect."59 Attention is to be focused primarily upon the suspect's per-
ception of the situation, rather than upon the intent of the police.6"
In essence, Innis refuses to label any police activity as interrogation
unless it is foreseeable that such conduct will elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.6
ing all pressure above and beyond that inherent in arrest and detention itself. Kamisar, supra
note 46, at 18.
54. U.S. CONST. amend V. Although the fifth amendment is often referred to as provid-
ing a privilege against self-incrimination, the privilege is actually against compelled self-in-
crimination. See id; H. FRIENDLY, A Postscript on Miranda, BECHMARKS 266, 271 (1967).
See also United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam); Anderson v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
A number of post-Miranda cases, however, have held incriminating statements inadmissi-
ble absent a finding of the compulsion normally associated with coercive interrogation. See,
e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 493 U.S. 324 (1969) (defendant was asked questions in his own bedroom
without Miranda warnings); Mathis v. Texas, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (defendant interviewed by
federal revenue agent in a state prison without Miranda warnings).
55. 100 S. Ct. at 1689.
56. Id at 1690.
57. The question of custody does not present itself in the Innir case. It is undisputed that
respondent was in custody while being transported to the police station. Id at 1688.
58. See note 5 supra The Court did not discuss the issue of whether respondent waived
his Miranda rights by speaking out to the police. They indicated that since respondent was not
interrogated for Miranda purposes, there existed no reason to reach a conclusion on the waiver
issue. Id at 1688 n.2.
Since the Innis Court did not address the issue of waiver, the scope of the discussion will
not be expanded to encompass the questions raised by it. Of interest, however, is the analysis
presented by Professor Joseph D. Grano, indicating that if interrogation was found to have
existed, the alleged waiver would have presented no issue whatsoever. Grano points out that
the alleged waiverfollowed the interrogation, and thus, would have had no effect. See Grano,
supra note 52.
59. 100 S. Ct. at 1689. The Court defined "incriminating evidence" as any statement that
the prosecution may later seek to introduce at trial. Id n.5.
60. Id at 1690. Although the Court feels that the perceptions of the suspect should be
afforded the greatest weight in determining whether "question-less" interrogation existed, it
clearly stated that the subjective intent of the officer is also a relevant factor. Id n.7.
61. Words or actions by police constitute interrogation only if the officers should have
known that they were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from the suspect.
The Innis standard does not represent a total departure from
prior cases seeking to determine whether interrogation existed,62 or
from prior definitions of the term.63 On the contrary, Innis develops
a meaning for interrogation that incorporates the factors deemed rel-
evant by these earlier decisions.64 Factors such as the officer's intent
Id at 1690. Knowledge by the police of an unusual susceptibility of the suspect to a particular
type of persuasion will be an important factor in determining the officer's ability to foresee the
consequences of his conduct. Id at 1690 n.8. See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)
(use of psychology on suspect known to be a deeply religious escapee from a mental institu-
tion; F. INBAU, supra note 50, at 60-62 (various interrogation techniques and tactics, including
appeals to suspect's conscience, honor, or sense of decency).
62. For cases determining that there was interrogation within the meaning of Miranda,
see, e.g., Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1980) (officer asked a question out of
suddent shock and surprise); Henry v. United States, 590 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1978) (defendant
made incriminating statements to his cellmate, a paid government informant); Combs v.
Wingo, 465 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1972) (reading ballistics report to defendant); Jones v. State, 346
So.2d 639 (Fla. App. 1977) (oral review of evidence to defendant); People v. Sanders, 55 Ill.
App. 3d 178, 370 N.E.2d 1213 (1977) (defendant told that co-defendant made a statement and
that case is strong); State v. Godfrey, 131 N.J. Super. 168, 329 A.2d 75 (1974) (statement to
defendant: "You're a liar. You were there. You did it. You did it."); Commonwealth v.
Mercier, 451 Pa. 211, 302 A.2d 337 (1973) (reading statement of a third party that implicated
defendant); Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 252 A.2d 575 (1969) (defendant told:
"You look kind of down in the dumps ... if you want to talk, talk."); State v. Boggs, 16 Wash.
App. 682, 559 P.2d 11 (1977) (questions in the course of "casual conversation").
For cases holding that there was not interrogation within the meaning of Miranda, see,
e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 611 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 3013
(1980) (conversation between police officers as to "everyday matters"); Stanley v. Wainwright,
604 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1979) (defendants placed in police vehicle with an activated tape re-
corder); United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied as to co-defendant,
429 U.S. 1099 (1977) (question regarding location of kidnap victim); United States v. Davis,
527 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 953 (1976) (defendant shown photograph
of himself in bank during course of robbery); Haire v. Sarver, 437 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1971)
(defendant's wife asked a question while in presence of defendant); People v. Webb, 243 Cal.
App. 2d 179, 52 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1966) (question inviting explanation of reason for being in
house with $200,000 worth of stolen furs); Commonwealth v. Franklin, 438 Pa. 411, 265 A.2d
361 (1970) (defendant told that witness had identified him, but they would like to hear his side
of the story); Owens v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 69, 235 S.E.2d 331 (1977) (officer told defend-
ant he knew he had committed the crime, and "it takes a man to tell the truth").
63. Prior definitions of interrogation have indicated that the inquiry should focus upon
whether the officer's conduct could reasonably have had the force ofa question on the accused,
Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 1980), and whether the conduct was calculated
to, expected to, or likely to elicit incriminating information. Eben v. State, 599 P.2d 700, 708
n.21 (Alaska 1979). According to Professor Welsh S. White, the test for determining the exist-
ence of interrogation should involve an objective, reasonable-man standard. White, Rhode Is-
land v. Innis: The Signicance of a Suspect's Assertion of His Right to Counsel, 17 AM. CuM. L.
REV. 53, 67 (1979). The court should attempt to determine whether the officer's conduct or
speech was of the type that would be likely to induce an average person situated in the sus-
pect's position to believe he was being subjected to interrogation. Id
Similarly, Professor Yale Kamisar focuses on the likelihood that police conduct will elicit
an incriminating response. Kamisar, supra note 46, at 9. Kamisar plays down the relevance of
the officer's intent or purpose. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text infra.
64. An analysis of prior cases and commentary reveals that three major factors are con-
sidered to be relevant in determining the existence or nonexistence of interrogation.
The first factor is the intent or purpose of the interrogating officer. If the officer intended
his words or actions to have the effect of a question and, hopefully, to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect, the officer's conduct will generally be considered as interrogation.
See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.
1980); Combs v. Wingo, 465 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1972); Haire v. Sarver, 437 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir.
1971); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292, 285 A.2d 172 (1971). See also Grano, supra
note 52, at 39; Kamisar, supra note 46, at 14; White, supra note 63, at 62-63.
The second factor is the suspect'sperception of the situation. If the suspect felt compelled
to elicit an incriminating response, the suspect's perception of the
officer's words or actions, and the reasonable-man's perception of the
situation,65 play an important role in determining whether an inter-
rogation existed for purposes of Miranda. Therefore, all three factors
should be given due consideration.66
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, expressed agree-
ment with the definition offered by the majority.67 Justice Marshall
stated that the Court has required "an objective inquiry into the
likely effect of police conduct on a typical individual, taking into
account any special susceptibility of the suspect."'6  Nevertheless, he
refused to recognize that interrogation did not exist in this particular
case. 6  Although the Court concluded that Innis was merely sub-
jected to subtle compulsion,7" Marshall viewed the police conduct as
an extremely strong appeal to the conscience7 1 of the suspect, bear-
ing close resemblance to a classic interrogation technique.72
Justice Stevens likewise felt that interrogation had occurred in
the Innis case, perceiving the definition offered by the Court to be
much too narrow.73  He declared that Miranda's protection was
designed to extend to any interrogation, not merely to an interroga-
tion that is reasonably likely to be successful.74 According to Justice
Stevens, police actions or statements must be deemed interrogation if
a reasonable person in the suspect's position would perceive them as
calling for a response.75
to speak as a result of the officer's words or actions, the officer's conduct may be found to
constitute interrogation. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 46, at 51; White, supra note 63, at 62.
The last factor is the objective, reasonable man's perception of the situation. If the officer's
words or actions would be considered by a reasonable man as likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect, such conduct will be deemed interrogation. See, e.g., Grano, supra
note 52, at 39; Kamisar, supra note 46, at 9; White, supra note 63, at 62-63.
65. See note 64 supra.
66. A number of courts and authors appear to afford greatest weight to the first of these
criteria--the intent or purpose of the officer. See, e.g., note 64 supra. But see White, supra
note 63, at 66-67 (preferring an objective, reasonable man standard over one focusing on an
individual's subjective beliefs or intentions).
67. 100 S. Ct. at 1692.
68. Id
69. Id
70. See note 5 supra,
71. 100 S. Ct. at 1692.
72. Id For a comprehensive discussion on interrogation techniques, see F. INBAU, supra
note 50.
73. 100 S. Ct. at 1694.
74. Id n.5. Justice Stevens noted that the Court's definition of interrogation contains a
loophole because some statements of a suspect will not be recognized as the product of interro-
gation even though the statements were deliberatey elicited by the police. He envisions this
possibility when the police, without any reason to believe their efforts will be successful, delib-
erately attempt to elicit information in hope that the suspect may nevertheless respond. Id at
1695 n.8.
75. Id at 1694. Justice Stevens' definition of interrogation includes any police conduct
that has the same purpose or effect as a direct question. Id at 1695. Any statement, whether
directed to the suspect or not, should be construed as interrogation if it appears to call for a
response or is designed to do so. Id
Although the members of the Court expressed extremely diver-
gent opinions regarding the holding in Innis76 and the resultant fate
of respondent, the significance77 of Innis lies in the definition given
to the term "interrogation."78 The disagreement 79 between Justices
Stewart and Stevens over the precise wording of such a definition is
readily understandable because "[a]n exact definition for 'custodial
interrogation' is, by its nature, an impossibility." 80
The Court has wrestled with the meaning of "custody" for
years.8' Innis, however, represents its first attempt82 to precisely de-
fine "interrogation." Although the standard enunciated by the Court
will undoubtedly provide clearer guidelines for law enforcement
agencies and courts to follow,83 recognition must be made that the
definition is, in fact, an initial one. In the past, the Court has demon-
strated its tendency to "shrink" and "chip away" at Miranda and its
requirements.8 4 It is likely that subsequent decisions interpreting the
scope of this definition of "interrogation" will tend to refine and
"chip away" at it as well. Until that time, however, Innis must be
recognized for what it actually is-a decision of first impression, in-
terpreting a material part of a significant doctrine.
76. Six of the nine Justices agreed that the officers' conduct resulted in no violation of
respondent's constitutional rights, while the remaining three asserted the contrary. 100 S. Ct.
1682 (1980). See also note 2 supra
77. The Court specifically stated that certiorari was granted in order to address the mean-
ing of "interrogation" under Miranda 100 S. Ct. at 1687.
78. See notes 55, 59 and accompanying text supra
79. See n6tes 73-75 and accompanying text supra
80. United States v. Clark, 425 F.2d 827, 832 (3d Cir. 1970). See also United States v.
Gibson, 392 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1968).
81. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathison, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam) (defendant volunta-
rily entered police station and answered questions); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341
(1976) (defendant questioned in his home); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (defendant
questioned at his residence); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (suspect questioned
while serving term in prison).
82. See notes 8, 47 and 77 supra
83. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966).
84. See Kamisar, supra note 46, at 80 n.473.
[casenote by Michael J. Toretti]

LIBEL AND SLANDER-First Amendment Limitations-Busi-
ness That Advertises Consumer Goods Becomes a Public Fig-
ure. Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir.
1980).
In Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, ' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a business that conducts an
intensive consumer-oriented advertising campaign is a public figure
2
and is required by the First Amendment of the Constitution3 to
prove actual malice in a defamation suit. Though not an "all pur-
pose" public figure, a business becomes a "limited purpose" public
figure4 when it alleges a defamation concerning its product and sales
techniques, when it has advertised extensively, and when it has
maintained ready access to the media to refute criticism. 5 In light of
incomplete and restrictive Supreme Court enunciations of who is a
public figure,6 Steak's Unlimited, Inc., significantly expands the con-
cept to include commercial enterprises that publicize themselves in
the course of promoting sales of consumer goods.
Steaks Unlimited, Inc. an Ohio corporation, held a four day
steak sale at rented locations in several Pittsburgh area department
stores. Although the frozen, chemically tenderized beef was un-
graded, it was United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) in-
spected.7 To promote the sale, Steaks Unlimited launched a $16,000
1. 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980).
2. Persons determined as a matter of law to be "public figures" have a limited legal
remedy when defamed: the first amendment protects all commentaiy on public figures that is
not knowingly false or recklessly in disregard of the truth. See note 30 and accompanying text
i~fra.
3. "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Two types of public figures have been recognized by the Supreme Court: the perva-
sively famous person who in all instances may sue for defamation only as a public figure ("all
purpose" public figure), and the private person who asserts himself in the context of a particu-
lar public controversy ("limited-purpose" public figure). See notes 26-27 and accompanying
text infra. See generally Eaton, The American Law of Defamation through Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. and Beyond- An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349 (1975).
5. See note 33 infraL
6. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text infra.
7. Meat cannot legally be sold in commerce unless it has been government inspected.
21 U.S.C. § 603 (1976). As a selling point, Steaks' salesmen allegedly emphasized to buyers
that the beef was "fully government inspected." Such a statement tells very little about the
meat's quality, which is described by grading. When interviewed, a local meat market worker
stated that "the beef was of 'very poor quality,' possibly the equivalent of utility, canner or
cutter, grades of meat inferior to commercial grade." 623 F.2d 264, 267 (3d Cir. 1980).
Commercial beef is graded according to its quality by the United States Department of
advertising campaign consisting of radio and newspaper promotions,
large signs at sales locations, and handbill distributions to persons in
the vicinity of the stores.8
Having noticed the advertisements' omission of prices per
pound and USDA grades, WTAE-TV consumer reporter Donna
Deaner investigated the sale when her station and the county bureau
of consumer affairs received numerous complaints concerning the
meat.9 Deaner's suspicions were heightened by a conversation with
a reliable meat market employee' 0 and a taped interview with a
Steaks' sales agent who made evasive statements about the meat's
quality and price."l After Deaner reported her investigation to the
consumer affairs director of one of the stores hosting the sale, the
store decided to terminate its lease agreement with Steaks Unlimited.
With the approval of the station's management, Deaner appeared on
the local news to report that Steaks Unlimited's promotions were
"total misrepresentations," that the quality of meat being sold
"would not even be touched" by reputable retailers, and that a host
department store had decided to "thoroughly end its endorsement of
this big steak sale" because of the reporter's revelations.' 2
Plaintifis libel' a action against Deaner, WTAE, and the Hearst
Agriculture. The grades, from highest to lowest quality, are as follows: prime, choice, good,
standard, commercial, utility, cutter, and canner. For a description of each of the grades, see 7
C.F.R. § 2853.106 (1980).
8. The court referred to the campaign as a "blitz." 623 F.2d 264, 274 (1980).
9. The Allegheny County Bureau of Consumer Affairs was itself unable to investigate
the sale because of a lack of resources. The bureau's administrator therefore suggested to
Deaner that the station pursue the matter. Id at 267.
10. See note 7 supra
11. When asked about the beef's price per pound, the salesman said that "per pound, the
prices vary." 623 F.2d 264, 268. In reference to its quality, he asserted the meat was "fully
government inspected." Id See note 7 supra
12. The facts indicate that defendants might have convinced a jury that they had cor-
rectly asserted the defense of truth. Truth is recognized in Pennsylvania as an affirmative
defense. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8343(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979). See Badami v. Dimson,
226 Pa. Super. Ct. 75, 310 A.2d 298 (1973).
Truth is a complete defense to a civil defamation action in all but eleven states, which
additionally require that the publication be made with a good motive or a justifiable end. See
generally A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 98 (1969).
13. Plaintiff alleged libel and slander in the broadcast. Brief for appellant at 1, Steaks
Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980). Some courts have ruled that all mass
media communications should be actionable as libel rather than slander, on the theory that
libel is to be applied to forms of communication that hold the greatest potential harm to repu-
tation. Eg., Anderson v. New York Tel. Co., 345 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 1973). Some cases
have thus treated defamation broadcast over radio or television as libel. Eg., Sorenson v.
Wood, 123 Neb. 345, 243 N.W. 82, app. dmd, 290 U.S. 599 (1932).
The majority of cases, however, have applied a questionable technical distinction, in
which defamations read from a prepared script are considered libel, but extemporaneous or
spontaneous words are treated as slander. Eg., Christy v. Stauffer Publications, Inc., 437
S.W.2d 814 (Tex. 1969). The basis of such an artificial classification is the common-law rule
that libel and slander are distinguished by the presence of a writing. See Summit Hotel Co. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939).
The court apparently uses "defamation" and "libel" interchangeably. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has held that common-law distinctions between the twin torts of libel and
Corporation, which was WTAE's parent company, was heard in the
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. 4 The court
determined that Pennsylvania law was applicable" in addressing the
issues of whether the reporter's words were capable of a defamatory
meaning and whether the Commonwealth's shield law'6 exempted
from discovery certain "outtakes" of filmed interviews used in the
report.'7 Federal constitutional principles controlled whether plain-
tiff meat company was a "public figure" for purposes of the libel
suit.'" The district court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment,' 9 determining that Steaks Unlimited could not meet its
burden of proving that defendants produced the damaging telecast
with knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth.20 The Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision based upon
a policy preference for consumer protection and the Supreme
Court's broad guidelines for "public figure" status.
In general, the status of a libel plaintiff as a public figure is a
crucial determination because public figures or officials have a judi-
cial remedy only if they can show that they have been defamed mali-
ciously. The Supreme Court held in the landmark case of New York
slander are not applicable to radio broadcasting. Purcell v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,
411 Pa. 167, 191 A.2d 662 (1963).
One court has referred to a defamation by broadcast as a "defamacast." American Broad-
casting, Inc. v. Simpson, 106 Ga. App. 230, 236, 126 S E.2d 873, 879 (1962). See general A.
HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 43 (1969).
14. Initially, the suit was brought in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio with federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. A change of venue
was granted on defendants' motion because the activities had occurred in Pennsylvania, where
most of the viewers of the broadcast were located. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
Steaks Unlimited incorporated and maintained its principal place of business in Ohio. At
the time the complaint was filed, Deaner was a Pennsylvania citizen. WTAE-TV is a Penn-
sylvania corporation and maintains its principal place of business there. Hearst is a Delaware
corporation whose principal place of business was New York. 623 F.2d 264, 268 n.4 (3rd Cir.
1980).
15. The determination of applicable law was based on the parties' consensual choice of
law. This choice was not challenged by the court, sua sponte, because the state whose law was
chosen had some interest in the outcome of the case. The state interest in this case was present
because the cause of action arose in Pennsylvania. See Pierce v. Capital Cities Communica-
tions, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 501 (3d Cir.), ceri. denied 439 U.S. 861 (1978).
16. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon Supp. 1979). See note 65 and accompany-
ing text infra
17. "Outtakes" refers to material filmed or recorded in preparation for a news report, but
not included in the actual broadcast. 623 F.2d 264, 277 n.60 (3d Cir. 1980).
18. Id at 271-72.
19. Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 468 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
20. Courts have noted that summary judgment is especially appropriate in first amend-
ment cases. The. District of Columbia Circuit Court has stated that "summary procedures are
essential to such litigation, because the fundamental right of free speech is at stake, and the full
and free exercise of that right is a primary purpose underlying the New York Times principle."
Washington Post Company v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The use of summary judgment "prevents all but the strongest libel cases from proceeding
to trial, thereby advancing the first amendment policy of shielding the press from harassment."
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper, 417 F. Supp. 947, 954 (D.D.C. 1976). See
generally Role of Summary Judgment in Political Libel Cases, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1783 (1979).
Times, Inc. v. Sullivan2 that the broad liability allowed in the com-
mon-law of libel and slander22 unconstitutionally impinged upon the
first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press, because the threat of litigation encouraged self-censorship and
inhibited open discussion of controversial public matters.23 The
Court, therefore, announced that no public official may recover
under any state's defamation law absent a showing "that the state-
ment was made with actual malice - that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of the truth. '24 The same rule
was subsequently applied to "public figures, ' 25 who are people that
achieve general fame or notoriety,26 or whose activities amount to a
thrusting of one's personality into the 'vortex' of an important public
controversy.
27
The broad rationale for limiting the legal recourse of public
figures and officials is the guarantee of free and open debate. This
rationale theoretically was broad enough to allow the court to simi-
larly limit the recourse of private individuals who complain of publi-
cations concerning any "matter of public interest. ' 28  The Court
hesitantly extended the sweep of New York Times in the direction of
a "matter of public interest" rule over the course of a decade.29 In
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,3o however, it finally retreated from pro-
tecting all comments on "matters of public interest," regardless of
the speaker's status. Instead, the present test was developed and
based on the firm dichotomy of public figure versus private individ-
ual.3 1
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22. Before 1964, the Supreme Court found defamatory statements to be outside the scope
of the first amendment. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1958). Thus, under the
common-law, strict liability attached to all defamatory communications that were not either
privileged or true. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 113 (4th ed. 1971). While this standard
of liability effectively safeguarded the reputations of citizens, it also inherently conflicted with
the constitutional guarantee of free speech and free press. Recognizing this conflicting consid-
eration, a number of privileges were developed under the common-law to attempt to limit tort
liability in the interest of fostering free speech. Id at 819. This condition was extended in a
minority ofjurisdictions to even false statements of facts concerning officials or public employ-
ees. See Noel, Defamation ofPublic Officers and Candidates, 49 COL. L. REV. 875 (1949) (list-
ing twenty-six states with the majority view, nine with the minority view). In New York
Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court adopted the minority ap-
proach to the privilege. See Comment, A Constitutional Revolution in the Law of Libel. New
York Times and Gertz Applied, 11 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 611 (1979).
23. 376 U.S. 254, 270.
24. Id at 279-80, 285-86.
25. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
26. Generally, the class of "all-purpose" public figures is limited to "household names."
See, e.g., Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976) (William F. Buckley, Jr.); Carson v.
Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976) (Johnny Carson).
27. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
28. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
29. Id.
30. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
31. Id at 343.
The "public figure" standard, which has not proven easy to ap-
ply,32 is based upon two rationales. First, defamed public figures
have the remedy of self-help; they have easy access to the news me-
dia, which allows them to counterargue or correct errors.33 Private
individuals, on the other hand, do not enjoy easy access to the press
and, thus, must rely on the law to protect their names. Second and
most important, public figures assume the risk of public comment
and criticism by occupying prominent roles in society or by openly
asserting themselves to try to influence the outcome of some particu-
lar public controversy.34 Private persons, however, do not open their
reputations to public scrutiny and so are more deserving of compen-
sation for their injuries than are public figures.35
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,3 6 the Supreme Court purposely
settled on an inexact definition of "public figure," intending for
courts to subsequently formulate "broad rules of general applica-
tion" that would accommodate the competing interests of press and
personal reputation. 7 The Supreme Court since then has been slow
to find such formulations satisfactory, and has employed a narrow
approach to overturn three circuits' characterizations of libel plain-
tiffs as public figures.38 Yet the purpose of the New York Times rule
emphasizes the necessity for courts to "articulate clear standards that
can guide both the press and the public. 39 Persons (notably the
press) who are uncertain of the scope of their right to speak out will
32. See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc. 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
33. The Supreme Court acknowledges that "the truth rarely catches up with a lie," but
has stated that simply because the self-help remedy "is inadequate to its task does not mean
that it is irrelevant." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974).
34. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979).
35. Id at 164.
36. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
37. Id at 343-44. Cf. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc. 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (establishing a "reasonable person's understanding" rule for identifying public figures).
38. Wolston v. Reader's Digest, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (plaintiff cited for contempt by
federal grand jury sixteen years prior to attack on same subject held to be a private figure);
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (researcher who received federal funds held to be
a private figure in his suit against a senator who criticized the researchers work); Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (wife of industrialist not made a public figure as a result of her
highly publicized divorce because she did not "freely choose to publicize issues as to the pro-
priety of her married life").
39. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc. 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The
Waldbaum court discussed the importance of clearly identifying the class of "public figure,"
both for the press and for the public. With an uncertain standard governing future litigation,
many members of the press will likely choose to "err on the side of suppression." Id at 1293.
Members of the general public, each a possible subject of press defamation, may be de-
terred from involvement in public affairs because it could not be predicted whether such con-
duct would carry with it "limited purpose public figure" status, and a lack of remedy for injury
to reputation. Democratic government has always encouraged citizen involvement in public
affairs, but suppression is fostered when vague rules govern the potential consequences of an
individual's participation in public life. Clear rules will allow a private person contemplating
public involvement to accurately foresee the effect of that involvement on his legal status, if he
is consequently defamed by the press. Id. See generally Dale and Dale, Full Court Press: The
Imperial Judiciary vs. The Paranoid Press, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 241 (1980).
hesitate to do so, fearing the impending possibility of a defamation
suit.40 The lack of specific guidelines for identifying a public figure
resulted in a "difficult constitutional question" for the Third Circuit
in Steaks.
4'
Under Pennsylvania law, a libel action requires proof of the fol-
lowing elements, the burden of which is on the plaintiff.42 First, the
published words must be defamatory in nature and must be under-
stood as being defamatory by their recipient.43 Second, the defama-
tory words must be communicated intentionally or without just
cause or excuse.' Two affirmative defenses against a libel action are
truth and privilege based on public policy.45 Analytical difficulties
have been encountered in past judicial attempts to mesh common-
law precedent, developed under the state's formulation, with modem
first amendment requirements.46
The Steaks court acknowledged these past analytical difficul-
ties, but found that the essential determination of a defamation case
under Pennsylvania law need involve only the following two princi-
pal inquiries: first, whether the plaintiff harmed the defendant's rep-
utation within the meaning of state law; and second, if so, whether
the first amendment nevertheless precludes recovery. 47 The Steaks
court in effect replaced the state tort law provisions for intent and
policy with the constitutional issues drawn by New York Times and
its progeny.48
40. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). A survey of case law
reveals that the vast majority of libel defendants are members of the press. The Steaks court
noted the strength of the deterrent value of libel litigation on the press because of its excessive
cost. 623 F.2d 264, 280 n.76 (3d Cir. 1980). Five years ago, the minimum cost of defending a
"full-fledged libel suit" was estimated at $20,000.00. Anderson, Libel and Press-Self-Ce or-
shio, 53 TEx. L. REv. 422, 435-36 (1975). The defense of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29 (1971), cost nearly $100,000.00. Id In Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 418
W. Va. 590, 211 S.E.2d 674, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975), the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals noted that in its state, "where a large portion of the State is served by
newspapers which lack substantial financial assets, the threat of potential libel actions becomes
repressive, not only because of possible judgments but also because of the inordinate legal
expenses normally incurred in defending a protracted libel suit." Id at 605, 211 S.E.2d at 690-
91. See 623 F.2d 264, 280 n.76 (3d Cir. 1980)
41. See note 39 supra
42. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8343(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
Dictum of the Steaks court questioned the constitutionality, in light of recent Supreme
Court rulings, of Pennsylvania's placement of the burden of proving truth on the defendant.
623 F.2d 264, 274 n.49 (1980). See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 n.10
(rejecting Justice White's opinion that it would be constitutional to require libel defendants to
prove the truth of allegedly defamatory statements). New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 271 (noting that tests that put the burden of proving truth on the speaker are consist-
ently rejected as being inconsistent with first amendment guarantees).
43. Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 441-42, 273 A.2d 899, 904 (1971).
44. Id at 451, 273 A.2d at 909.
45. 623 F.2d 264, 270 (3d Cir. 1980).
46. 623 F.2d 264, 271 (3d Cir. 1980). For a general discussion of the analytical difficul-
ties encountered when applying first amendment principles to state tort law formulations see
Wade, The Communicative Torts and the First Amendment, 48 Miss. L.J. 671 (1976)
47. 623 F.2d at 270.
48. Id. at 271-72.
The initial issue considered by the Steaks court was whether or
not the reported words were capable of a defamatory meaning,
under the Commonwealth's law. Defamation has been defined by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as a communication that suffi-
ciently harms the reputation of another so as "to lower him in the
eyes of the community or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him."'" Telecast statements that an enterprise was en-
gaged in "total misrepresentation" were found by the Steaks court to
satisfy this definition because of the statements' potential threat to
the enterprise's commercial dealings. 50 Once a communication is de-
termined to be defamatory under Pennsylvania law, the intent neces-
sary to complete the cause of action is presumed to exist. The
presumption may be rebutted, however, by a defense of privilege
based on public policy.5 The Steaks Court interpreted treatment of
prima facie defamatory statements as depending upon the Supreme
Court led evolution of "first amendment libel law."52
Examining the multi-jurisdictional evolution of the law of libel
within the confines of the first amendment, which focuses on the
plaintiff's status as a public figure or official, the court found that
public figure plaintiffs must prove "with convincing clarity" that the
defendants published false material with knowledge of its falsity or
with reckless disregard of the truth.53 To determine whether the
plaintiff was a public or private figure in Steaks, the court funda-
mentally relied on the broad principles adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 11 Both sides conceded
that Steaks Unlimited was not an "all purpose" public figure, but
disputed whether the company was a "limited purpose" public figure
as a result of having "thrust themselves to the forefront" of a particu-
lar public controversy in order to influence the controversy's out-
come.
55
The Steaks court found that plaintiff possessed both of the char-
acteristics of a limited purpose public figure. Steaks Unlimited's in-
tensive advertising campaign demonstrated regular and continuing
access to the media, absent evidence that further rebuttal advertise-
49. Id at 270, quoting, Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 449-50, 273 A.2d
889, 908-09 (1971).
50. Id at 271. The court must decide whether the words complained of could be defam-
atory as a matter of law, before a jury determines how the words were actually understood.
Despite strong evidence that the published words were understood to be defamatory, the
Steaks court found that the matter of how the words were actually understood remained the
subject of a jury determination, should the summary judgment be disallowed. See id at 271.
51. 623 F.2d 264, 271 (3d Cir. 1980).
52. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
53. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
54. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
55. Id at 345.
ments would have been refused or unaffordable.5 6 The court took a
novel perspective" in holding that commercial advertising fulfills
the "media access" requirement but did not specify whether it re-
ferred only to those who regularly advertise before the alleged defa-
mation is made, or instead to all libel plaintiffs who have the means
to "advertise" a rebuttal.58
The more important trait of a voluntary assumption of the risk
of injury from defamation, was also found in plaintiff's advertising
campaign, primarily because it was aimed at the public's consumer
interests. The court emphasized the increasingly evident public pol-
icy favoring the promotion of consumer interest and awareness, for
which free dissemination of information to the public without fear of
civil liability for minor inaccuracies in reporting is essential.59
Only those commercial advertisers, whose advertising of con-
sumer goods creates a controversy surrounding their quality, should
56. 623 F.2d at 274.
57. Plaintiff contended, "Public figures are sought out for their opinions and reactions.
Private individuals must pay to advertise." Brief for appellant at 12, Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v.
Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980).
58. The obvious undesirability of advertising one's product as "not of poor quality" to
refute alleged defamations emphasizes the limited effectiveness of the self-help remedy and
suggests it may be even more limited for commercial enterprises. See note 34 supra,
In the same vein, the Steaks court declined to rule on defendants' contention that plaintiff
should be considered a public figure simply because it is a corporation. 623 F.2d 264, 274 n.47
(3d Cir. 1980). The District of Columbia District Court has recognized an inherent distinction
between the state's interest in protecting private persons as opposed to corporations.
That court found it readily apparent that the reputational interests the Supreme Court has
found most compelling "are associated solely with natural persons, and that corporations,
while legal persons for some purposes, possess none of the attributes the Court [has] sought to
protect." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper, 417 F. Supp. 947, 955 (D.D.C.
1976).
The District of Columbia court therefore stated that corporations can be sufficiently pro-
tected by a rule that the malice standard applies only when issues of legitimate public concern
are discussed. The rule that alleged defamations regarding "matters of public concern" re-
quire any plaintiff, public or private, to prove malice, has been discredited for at least
noncorporate plaintiffs by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The court's ap-
proach grants some deference to the values underlying corporate libel actions developed under
state law, while at the same time purporting to result in only a minor infringement on the first
amendment and to defend the market place of ideas. 417 F. Supp. at 956.
An opposite view was recently taken in Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc.,
25 Cal. 3d 763, 603 P.2d 14, 160 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1979), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3234 (October
6, 1980):
[Tihere is no distinction between the protectible interest in reputation of corpo-
rations and individuals and the former as much as the latter may recover special,
general and punitive damages. . . . While it is true that the Supreme Court's opin-
ions in these cases have been cast in terms of protecting the rights of individuals, it is
also true that the line between the interests of natural persons and corporations is
frequently fuzzy and ill-defined. Various legal considerations have long led to the
incorporation of businesses that are in economic reality but individual proprietor-
ships or partnerships. On the other hand, very large business enterprises may be
conducted as individual proprietorships or partnerships. For that additional reason,
it seems that for purposes of applying the First Amendment to defamation claims, the
distinction between corporations and individuals is one without a difference.
Id at 767, 603 P.2d at 18-19, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 103, quoting, Trans World Accounts, Inc v.
Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 819 (N.D. Cal. 1977). See 623 F.2d 264, 274 n.47 (1980).
59. 623 F.2d at 280.
face a limited legal remedy against their critics.' In Hutchinson v.
Proxmire6 and Wolston v. Reader's Digest, Inc.,6 2 the Supreme
Court narrowed "public figure" to exclude plaintiffs who have been
injected into the public eye through force, circumstance, or solely
through the acts of the defendant. The Steaks court found that this
was not at issue because plaintiff did not dispute defendant's conten-
tion that its actions were in response to the controversy existing when
consumers began complaining about the sale. 3 Because plaintiff as
a public figure presented insufficient evidence to contradict numer-
ous affidavits supporting defendant's belief in the truthfulness of the
report, there remained no triable question of fact concerning defend-
ants' disregard for the truth.64
The final issue addressed by the court was plaintiff's contention
that Pennsylvania's shield law65 does not prevent discovery of "out-
takes" 66 from filmed interviews used in an allegedly defamatory re-
port. The shield law prohibits discovery of confidential media news
sources in civil or criminal litigation in order to allow the press ac-
cess to "willing-if-anonymous" sources.6 ' The statute has been inter-
preted broadly by Pennsylvania courts because the legislative policy
of protecting news sources is of greater importance than the disclo-
sure of potential evidence in any legal proceeding. 68 All sources of
information are protected, including personal identities, documents,
and recordings. 69 Plaintiff's contention that the primary source of
the outtakes was already known did not remove the shield law's pro-
tection, because the identity of secondary sources might have been
revealed by the outtakes nonetheless. 70 The court thus found it ap-
propriate to apply the general Pennsylvania rule that all nonpub-
60. Id at 280. But cf. Vegod Corp. v. Am. Broadcasting Co., Inc., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 603
P.2d 14, 160 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1979) (advertising and "going-out-of-business" sale does not make
retail seller a public figure), cert. denied 49 U.S.L.W. 3234 (October 6, 1980).
61. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
62. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
63. 623 F.2d at 280. See Comment, Defamation and the First Amendment in the 1978
Term" Diminishing Protectionfor the Media, 48 U. CIN. L. REV 1027 (1979). One of the under-
lying requirements for obtaining and retaining a Federal Communication Commission Li-
cense to broadcast is that the licensee serve the "public convenience interest, and necessity."
47 U.S.C. § 307 (1976).
64. 623 F.2d at 276-77.
65. 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
No person engaged on, connected with, or employed by any newspaper of general
circulation or any press association or any radio or television station, or any mafa-
zine of general circulation, for the purpose of gathering, procuring, compiling, editing
or publishing news, shall be required to disclose the source of any information pro-
cured or obtained by such persons, in any legal proceeding, trial or investigation
before any government unit.
Id § 5942(a).
66. See note 17 supra
67. In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
68. Id at 42, 193 A.2d at 185-86.
69. Id at 40, 193 A.2d at 185-86.
70. 623 F.2d 264, 279 (3d Cir. 1980).
lished portions of a source's statements are protected, regardless of
whether the source's identity is already known.7
Steaks Unlimited Inc. v. Deaner represents a significant attempt
by the Third Circuit to provide one "workable principle of broad
application" by which the elusive but crucial determination of public
figure status will be facilitated in libel and slander cases. A seller
that through advertising seeks the public's attention in order to influ-
ence consumer choice is a public figure. Unless the Supreme Court
chooses to further narrow the scope of the public figure category,72
first amendment protection from civil liability for defamation is as-
sured, at least within the Third Circuit, to all reporters or advocates
who do not knowingly lie or recklessly disregard the truth in at-
tempting to expose consumer frauds.
71. Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 3 Pa. D & C.3d 693 (C.P. Alleg. County
1977).
72. Appellee Steaks Unlimited, Inc. is not likely to ask for certiorari because, according
to its counsel, it has "run out of money to maintain further legal action." Nat'l L.J. May 12,
1980, at 5, col. 1. See note 40 supra In addition, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari of a
case presenting the public figure issue with similar facts. Vesgood Corp. v. American Broad-
casting Co., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 603 P.2d 14, 160 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1979), cert. denie 49 U.S.
U.S.L.W. 3234 (October 6, 1980). See note 60 supra.
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